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 The Tunisian uprisings
1 of 2010-2011 constituted a moment that can be described as “fugitive 
democracy,” a term coined by Sheldon Wolin to describe ephemeral and exceptional moments of 
commonality that contrast with fractioned everyday institutionalized politics. In the context of 
“fugitive democracy,” “a free society composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of 
commonality when, through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect 
the  well-being  of  the  collectivity.”
2  Between  the  self-immolation  of  Mohamed  Bouazizi  on 
December 17, 2010, and the departure of President Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, Tunisians 
experienced  such  a  political  moment:  the  usual  boundaries  separating  those  excluded  from 
political  institutions  from  those  included  in  them  disappeared.  It  was  precisely  during  this 
moment–comparable to a tabula rasa–that it became possible for demonstrators all over Tunisia 
to readily demand and imagine the possibility of an entirely new political system. This desire for 
radical change was illustrated by the slogan declaimed by the protestors on January 14, 2011, the 
day Ben Ali fled: “the people want to bring down the regime” (al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam). It 
could  also  be  heard  in  the  now  famous  imperative  “Dégage!,”
3  addressed  in  French  to  the 
president and to the police in front of the building of the feared ministry of Interior on the main 
avenue of the capital. 
During the uprisings, protesters did not represent the future as ‘Islamic’ or ‘secular.’ 
They simply saw it as reconfigurable, for the sudden absence of institutionalized politics made it 2  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
ripe for radical change, allowing unification around the demand for a total rupture with the past. 
The  religious/secular  dichotomy,  although  an  ordinary  staple  in  the  political  narratives  of 
authoritarian  politics,  did  not  help  Tunisians  articulate  their  political  demands,  chiefly  the 
departure of their dictator and the end of his regime. They saw themselves as one “people” 
endowed with agency, as expressed in “the people want” (al-sha‘b yurid).
4 Once the president 
fled, as if obeying at once the order of the people, this exceptional and extraordinary moment 
ended and with it fugitive democracy.  
After the departure of the President, a second phase followed. Institutional differences re-
emerged and, for many Tunisians, the extraordinary moment of fugitive democracy became a 
thawra  (revolution),  only  reasserting  itself  through  nostalgia  or  celebration.  For  some,  the 
revolution had been stolen, as recounted to me by a young Tunisian who had demonstrated 
against  Ben  Ali’s  regime  during  the  protests:  “in  the  end,  the  revolution  failed.  They  [the 
political parties] used us, they used the story of the revolution.”
5 For others, such as political 
parties and state representatives, it was time to speak and act “in the name of the revolution.”
6 
The uprisings, because of their success, were memorialized in all sorts of images and narratives, 
inside  and  outside  the  state  administration.  As  early  as  March  2011,  postal  stamps  were 
commemorating  the  thawra.  Its  memory  remained  utterly  present  and  operated  as  the 
foundational event of a new era of politics. It allowed a distinction in the history of Tunisia 
between the time “before” and the time “after the revolution.” In this second phase, anxious 
interrogations about the place and role of Islam and secularism in Tunisia took over the newly 
opened and variegated field of political competition. Tunisians were projecting the question of 
Islam back into the analysis of the nature of the massive movement that created a political 
rupture, even if to insist on the fact that it was not an “Islamic revolution.” As Ajmi Lourimi, a Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          3 
member of the political bureau of the Islamist party al-Nahdha told me in the summer of 2011: 
“This  was  not  an  Islamic  revolution.  It  was  a  nationalist  and  popular  revolution  (thawra 
wataniyya wa sha‘biyya). Of course it was not devoid of questions related to identity. But it was 
a  secular  revolution  (thawra  ‘ilmaniyya)  that  did  not  take  place  against  Islam.”
7  This 
overwhelming re-entry of “Islam” and “secularism” into the arena of electoral politics and of 
deliberative public expressions turned out to be complicated by the history of these concepts 
within Tunisia before the uprisings. Under the authoritarian regimes of Presidents Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali, the public interpretations of Islam and of the attendant concept of secularism were 
essentially defined and authorized by the state. The state administration tightly regulated and 
controlled Islamic institutions and narratives, those men and women who articulated them, as 
well  as  what  it  deemed  to  be  “correct”  Muslim  practices  in  a  “modern”  Tunisia.  After  the 
departure of Ben Ali, in a context of expanded freedoms of expression in the public space and of 
a weakened central authority, narratives about Islam and secularism multiplied and served as 
differentiation devices in the political arena. Tunisians who referred to Islam as a normative 
element of social life and politics demanded the liberation of the discourses on Islam and of the 
religious institutions from the state’s control, such as  mosques, religious schools, and fatwas.
8 
They also wanted to impose limits on what they considered to be non-Islamic behaviors. Those 
who referred to the idea of a Tunisia they wanted to be “secular” or “modern,” demanded the 
liberation  of  expression  in  almost  all  its  forms,  but  often  wanted  to  impose  limits  on  some 
expressions of Islam they deemed dangerous or incorrect. For both sides, the content and limits 
of the newly acquired freedom needed to be defined. New battle lines were drawn that had less to 
do with the pitting of the pro “Islamic state” camp versus the pro “democratic-secular state” 
forces–as they were often described by the actors themselves–than with different conceptions of 4  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
freedom (hurriyya) and of its content and limits. It is worth noting that, unlike the secular versus 
Islamic state debate, freedom was a concept conspicuously present in the 2010-2011 protests, for 
instance in the slogan “Work, freedom, national dignity” (shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniyya).  
What  did  freedom  mean  for  Tunisians  after  the  departure  of  Ben  Ali?  Should  it  be 
allowed to say and do anything? In other words what are the limits to one’s exercise of freedom 
and how are these limits defined? I argue that these questions on the meaning of freedom that 
proliferated in the public arena in combination with those on Islam and secularism, were less 
about the form of the political regime–there was a consensus among Tunisians that it should be a 
republican  electoral  democracy–than  about  the  “ways  of  life”  of  Tunisians.  The  Tunisian 
political  transition  can  help  examine  how  conceptions  of  “ways  of  life,”  that  is,  the 
understanding  of  correct  beliefs  and  conduct,  translate  into  and  shape  politics.  Political 
ideologies neither made themselves visible in the uprisings, nor emerged as important forces 
shaping  the  dynamics  of  the  transition.  “This  revolution  was  mute,  it  did  not  articulate  an 
ideological project,”
9 a Tunisian professor of philosophy commented to me in June 2011. This 
diagnosis  was  echoed  by  a  secondary  school  teacher  who  interpreted  the  uprisings  as  “a 
revolution of bodies, not minds.”
10 “The youth have projects, but they are personal projects,” a 
member of the Maghrebi Liberal Party also told me.
11 I contend that this is the case because after 
January 14, 2011, rather than fight for specific ideological systems and for these ideologies’ 
specific understandings of the state, Tunisian political elites cared, debated, and fought about 
safeguarding their individual ways of life and about the attendant conception of freedom they 
imagined. 
  In  order  to  delve  into  the  new  politics  of  post-Ben  Ali  Tunisia,  a  politics  devoid  of 
ideological projects but animated by convictions about how one ought to live, I start this essay Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          5 
with  an  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  Tunisian  protests.  An  uprising  stemming  from  an 
economic crisis and deep regional economic inequalities at first, it rapidly became political, 
leading to the fall of the President of the Republic and to the expansion of freedom of expression. 
In spite of the prevailing dire economic problems, the public political discussions during the 
transition period that followed focused on the meaning of “Islamism” and “secularism,” as they 
related to definitions of ways of life. I examine these discussions by focusing mainly on the 
Islamist party al-Nahdha and its conceptions of “secularism.” I show that like most other parties, 
it  supported  the  idea  of  an  electoral  democracy  combined  with  a  religious  establishment. 
Although the project of electoral democracy was one that contrasted with the practices of the 
previous regime, the notion of a religious establishment molded itself into its institutions. I argue 
that Islamist and secularist intellectuals and activists, taking advantage of the new freedoms of 
expression, competed on their different conceptions of ways of life, whereas a status quo was 
maintained  on  an  institutional  relationship  between  state  and  religion  that  enabled  the 
formulation of limits to freedoms. I end this essay by showing how the notion of “public order” 
was invoked in several legal affairs in post-Ben Ali Tunisia to outline the content and limits of 
individual freedoms, in continuity with the previous authoritarian regime. The fear of chaos 
spurred by religious confrontations brought back the state into being the institution maintaining 
order, an order called for by Islamists and secularists alike to put limits to the new freedoms and 
safeguard each camp’s ways of life. 
  
1.  From Economics to Politics: The Collapse of Two Myths 
The Collapse of the Myth of the Tunisian “Economic Miracle” 6  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
The uprisings that started in late 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, opened up a new political era. In 
post-colonial Tunisia, and more largely in post-colonial North Africa, popular protests were not a 
new phenomenon. Dubbed the “bread revolts,” they had punctuated social and economic life 
since the 1960s, but had never led to regime change.
12 In 2011, however, a strong and massive 
popular mobilization succeeded in beheading the state and opened up a transitional period that 
led to free elections for a Constituent Assembly and a new interim government. In Tunisia, as in 
Egypt and Libya, the success of these protests in toppling the heads of the regimes indicated that 
any type of negotiated or “pacted” transition had failed and that it took the force of popular 
mobilization in the streets to produce political change: these regimes were not able, contrary to 
what  many  observers  and  analysts  were  expecting,  to  reform  from  within.
13  The  traditional 
political opposition itself was not at the origin of these uprisings. The popular protests were not 
led by the traditional legal and illegal opposition groups, who were in fact surprised by the 
course of these extraordinary events. In addition, not only did political change originate from 
outside the regime itself and from outside the sphere of the traditional opposition: it originated 
from  outside  the  political  field  tout  court.  It  was  the  economic  crisis  that  precipitated  the 
Tunisian protests. As if politics could not take care of itself, the economic crisis became the force 
behind political change. In the decade that ended in 2008, the Tunisian economy grew at an 
annual rate of about 5%, leading international observers as well as the regime itself to speak of a 
“Tunisian economic miracle.”
14 But after the financial crisis of 2008, with the contraction of the 
global economy, especially in Europe, which is the main export market for Tunisia, growth 
weakened. This made the economic situation fragile. Between 2007 and 2010, Tunisia’s GDP 
annual growth rate decreased from 6.3% to 3.7%.
15 During the same period, indicators of well 
being also decreased,
16 leading an increasing number of young Tunisians to attempt to migrate Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          7 
legally or illegally to Europe.
17 In 2008, unemployment rates reached 13% on average but were 
30% for the youth (15-24 years).
18 In the 1990s, the World Bank had hailed Tunisian economic 
reforms as successful but had neglected the significance of growing inequalities. The nature of 
the 2010-2011 protests were what made the World Bank recognize the necessity of taking into 
account social exclusion and economic inequalities in its evaluations.
19 In the center regions of 
Tunisia, such as Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid, the cradle of the 2010-2011 uprisings, increasing 
inequalities and social exclusion were at the source of the uprisings.
20 After the departure of Ben 
Ali, the myth of the “economic miracle,” which had been cultivated by the regime, fell apart. 
 
An Uprising against Social Exclusion Turned Political 
This is not to say that the uprisings had no political significance. In Tunisia, week after week, as 
new  towns  and  cities  joined  in  the  protests,  progressively  reaching  Tunis,  the  capital,  the 
demonstrations  became  endowed  with  clear  political  meaning.  They  carried  a  strong  moral 
condemnation  of  the  regime.  Indeed,  the  self-immolation  of  Bouazizi,
21  rather  than  being 
interpreted as another sign of the suffering of the disinherited youth, was recounted by political 
activists as a political assassination: the state was the real culprit of Bouazizi’s death because it 
had failed to respond to his requests for help.
22 The absence of ideological slogans inspired by 
the intellectual traditions of the opposition was striking. Shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniyya 
(Work, freedom, national dignity) was one of the most repeated slogans early in the protests. The 
notion of dignity (karama) was central in the narratives of the protests, which denounced the 
economic  and  political  humiliation  that  Tunisians  experienced  daily  under  the  authoritarian 
regime.  National  dignity  was  understood  to  proceed  from  the  first  two  items  evoked  in  the 
slogan: work and freedom. Unlike during the nationalist struggle against French occupation, 8  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
national dignity was not to proceed from gaining independence from the foreigner. This time, the 
collective sense of belonging to one’s nation would proceed from individual rights of access to 
economic opportunities. The people’s demands were focused on their material conditions of life. 
However,  these  demands  also  expressed  a  desire  for  a  new  type  of  relationship  between 
Tunisians and their state. The demand for economic access was deeply linked to a demand for 
access to citizenship. Tunisians wanted to be recognized as citizens instead of being treated as 
subjects. A few days before January 14, 2011 the blend of economic and political demands gave 
way to a new slogan: “The people want to topple the regime” (al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam). 
From its economic and moral origins, the movement became clearly political. In the Tunisian 
and international media, the uprisings were interpreted as a “secular revolution,” whose actors 
had asserted universal values. 
 
The Collapse of the Myth of Secular Tunisia 
After the departure of President Ben Ali, a new political chapter in the history of Tunisia started: 
a political transition in which competitive electoral politics played a central role as the pressure 
of street politics progressively waned, in spite of episodic flare ups, for the next few months. 
This second phase led to the legalization of political parties: more than 100 of them competed for 
the  electors’  votes.  This  marked  a  strong  break  with  the  previous  55  years  of  post-colonial 
politics  in  Tunisia,  during  which  no  election  was  held  in  a  fair  and  free  context  and  the 
opposition was either co-opted and considerably weakened or brutally repressed. Among these 
political parties stood those that had traditionally shaped the Tunisian political landscape: from 
the old communist party to the center left political groups and the Islamist movement al-Nahdha. 
In this newly opened political game, the Islamist party, authorized in March 2011 for the first Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          9 
time,  became  the  object  of  heated  controversies.  What  was  to  become  of  “secular”  and 
“modernist” Tunisia if al-Nahdha won the election? This question haunted most of Tunisian 
elites as well as many international observers. It took a more urgent turn when the election 
results  were  announced.  The  Islamist  party  obtained  the  highest  number  of  seats  in  the 
Constituent Assembly, winning 89 seats out of a total of 217, way ahead of two center-left 
political parties, the Congrès pour la République (CPR) (29 seats) and Ettakatol (21 seats, the 
Arabic acronym for the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties). An independent list, al-
‘aridha al-sha‘biyya (The Popular Petition), obtained 26 seats. This electoral result highlighted 
al-Nahdha’s popularity and deeply shattered the Tunisian political landscape, from which it had 
been excluded since the creation of its movement in 1981. As had happened with the image of an 
economically successful Tunisia, the myth of a “secular” and “modern” Tunisia fell apart. 
It was striking that in spite of the daunting economic problems that Tunisia was facing at 
the time, the public debates during and after the electoral campaign did not focus mainly on 
economic policy or social questions, but rather on the future role of the Islamist party and on the 
place  of  religion  in  politics.  Although  it  was  often  repeated  during  and  in  the  immediate 
aftermath of Ben Ali’s fall that the Tunisian uprisings were not founded on religious demands 
and  would  not  lead  to  an  “Islamic  revolution,”
23  Islam  and  its  place  in  society  and  politics 
haunted the public discussions. This “discursive explosion,”
24 to borrow a phrase from Michel 
Foucault,  merits  an  examination.  Indeed,  it  seemed  that  Islam  as  a  political  concept  was 
simultaneously repressed by a desire to marginalize its political significance and persistently 
brought up as an object of public interest
25. 10  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
To understand this paradox, it is necessary to examine the history of the Tunisian Islamist 
movement’s ideas and political behavior, since its ideology and strategic intentions were at the 
center of the debates animating Tunisian transitional politics.  
 
2.  The Tunisian Islamist Movement, Modernity, and Secularism 
The Tunisian Islamist movement started to take shape at the end of the 1960s, first as an a-
political trend influenced by the Pakistani Jama‘at al-Tabligh, which was active in Tunisia at that 
time. In the beginning, the movement only focused on seeking to bring Tunisians back to Islamic 
practices  and  morals,  and  was  not  interested  in  politics.  In  the  mid  1970s,  however,  the 
movement politicized and took advantage of the riots of January 1978 to exert its influence on 
the student movement and on the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the strong 
workers trade union. It was established in 1981 under the name of the Islamic Trend Movement 
and became “al-Nahdha” (renaissance) in 1988, one year after Ben Ali took over, with the hope 
that a less religious name would allow it to be legally authorized. However, it was not legalized 
as a political party until March 2011, two months after Ben Ali’s fall. Before the October 23, 
2011 election, its members were never authorized to participate in electoral politics, except as 
independent candidates in the 1989 legislative election. Its legalization into a political party in 
2011  allowed  it  to  vie  for  votes  in  the  newly  opened  competitive  electoral  market.  Well 
organized from its inception, it became a mass movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, in contrast 
with all the other political parties of the opposition that were not able to mobilize popular masses 
around their ideas. It was brutally repressed in the 1990s and in the first decade of the 21
st 
century, but it remained popular. Other parties were unable to secure a comparable position in 
the election of October 23, 2011, in part because they were unable to unite under a single banner Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          11 
and in part because al-Nahdha benefited from its legitimacy as a movement that was particularly 
victimized  by  the  authoritarian  regime  and  could  unite  around  the  leadership  of  Rached 
Ghannouchi.   
 
Al-Nahdha’s Political Thought and the Question of Democracy 
How can we define or summarize the political thought at the foundation of the ideology of the al-
Nahdha party? It is simply impossible to respond to this question because its ideology is not 
based on a systematic theoretical edifice about politics or about the state more particularly. In 
other words, al-Nahdha’s ideology is not based on a systematic and coherent theory that can be 
reconstructed through the reading of its founder, Rached Ghannouchi. It is not possible to outline 
with precision the polity that Ghannouchi imagines. His writings are not meant to provide a 
political theory, but are rather responses to questions raised by contextual politics. This is in 
particular true for its stance on the question of democracy and for its definition–or lack thereof–
of  the  Islamic  state.  In  the  past,  al-Nahdha’s  official  ideology  did  not  openly  and  publicly 
espouse arguments in favor of the use of violence, although the movement was thought to be 
associated with violent attacks in Tunisia.
26 The founding document of the Tunisian Islamist 
movement  included  democracy  as  a  recognized  principle.  Early  in  the  1980s,  Rached 
Ghannouchi wrote that democracy was a necessity for Tunisian political life, but did not develop 
a reflection on the relation between democracy and Islam or if and how an Islamic state could be 
democratic.
27 Among Al-Nahdha’s leaders, some might also have envisioned the possibility of 
operating  in  a  non-democratic  context  in  which  they  might  have  shared  power  within  the 
incumbent regime. As for Ghannouchi, in the mid 1980s, the efforts of the Islamist movements 
had to be focused on survival rather than on theoretical and programmatic thoughts.
28 However, 12  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
while in exile in London after 1989, Ghannouchi had the opportunity to elaborate further on the 
question of democracy and Islam, and to insist on his commitment to democracy.
29 The 2011 
political  transition  gave  al-Nahdha  the  opportunity  to  test  this  commitment  and  put  it  into 
practice, creating a tension between the theoretical combination of Islam and democracy and the 
practice of democracy.  
This shift towards more attention to democracy by al-Nahdha was not unique in the 
Tunisian political landscape. Until January 14, 2011, the majority of the opposition experienced 
political life through cooptation and exclusion, rather than through the ballot box. Most of the 
political opposition, from left to right, only started to envision democracy and the principles of 
human  rights  as  a  crucial  component  of  political  life  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  As  Moncef 
Marzouki, head of the center-left CPR, who became interim president in 2011, said, “I became 
truly conscious of living under a dictatorship when I returned from France [to Tunisia] in 1978… 
When I was in France, I did not care about democracy. I was part of a socialist trend. I had even 
gone to China… I was deeply indifferent to the question of democracy. I considered it a cultural 
oddity. It was only when I eventually went back to Tunisia that I started thinking about that 
question.” 
30 The evolution of the al-Nahdha movement towards a commitment to democracy is 
therefore not unique, but rather a feature of most political opposition groups since the end of the 
1970s in Tunisia. 
In the 2000s, al-Nahdha also decided on a political rapprochement with non-Islamist 
opposition parties and groups that were now committed to democracy and were also repressed by 
the regime. Part of the Tunisian left and the Islamists of al-Nahdha rallied together to demand 
more freedoms from Ben Ali’s regime, forming the October 18, 2005 movement in favor of what 
they called “a minimum wage of democracy.”
31 In interaction with other groups, the Islamist Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          13 
movement’s leaders insisted on democratic commitment.
32 Al-Nahdha’s more recent narratives, 
as they emerge from the writings and pronouncements of its leaders in the decade that preceded 
the 2010-11 uprisings,
33 indicate a deep engagement of the Tunisian Islamist project with the 
concepts at the heart of liberal democracy. This combination of democracy and Islam was based 
on the adherence to the principles of electoral democracy on the one hand and on Islamic law 
being  understood  as  the  result  of  democratic  legislation  rather  than  originating  from  divine 
commands on the other hand.
34 Al-Nahdha’s emphasis on democracy was also accompanied by a 
desire to keep established religion at the heart of the polity, in continuity with the regimes of 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali. This allowed the movement to speak of the state as a “civil state” (dawla 
madaniyya) that was nonetheless the guardian and the regulator of Islam and to keep Islam–and 
conservative moral values–at the center of politics. In that sense, al-Nahdha’s conception of the 
relationship between state and religion did not differ much from the way in which the previous 
post-colonial  regimes  had  organized  it.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  level  of  its  strategic  and 
political behavior as a political party it strived to behave democratically, in accordance with its 
official declarations of commitment to democracy. This is where it differentiated itself from the 
previous regimes.  
 
“Its Religion is Islam”: Debates and Agreements about Article 1 of the Constitution 
The position taken by the leadership of al-Nahdha on Article 1 of the Constitution illustrates the 
convergence  between  the  Islamist  party’s  conception  of  the  relationship  between  state  and 
religion and the legal structures of the old state in this regard. After the departure of President 
Ben Ali, the 1959 Constitution was suspended and the interim government decided, under the 
pressure of constant demonstrations in the street, the election of a Constituent Assembly. New 14  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
debates  surrounding  Article  1  of  the  1959  Tunisian  constitution  emerged.  Article  1  states, 
“Tunisia is a free and sovereign state, its language is Arabic, its religion is Islam, and its regime 
is the Republic.” What was to become of this article in the new constitution drafting process? 
Intense debates about its meaning showed that Tunisians gave it different interpretations ranging 
from the definition of the people’s identity, to the principles of sharia being at the foundation of 
the  state.  However,  during  the  electoral  campaign  and  even  more  so  after  the  elections  of 
October 23, 2011, it was rare to find a political party that was ready to raise objections against 
the  inclusion  of  this  article  in  the  future  constitution.  This  was  because  its  absence  would 
produce heated disagreements whereas its presence could satisfy all types of interpretations, 
since it could be read in different ways. Article 1 could be accepted by all precisely because it 
had different meanings for different constituencies, without these differences being explicit in its 
formulation.  When  asked  about  Article  1  in  the  summer  of  2011,  a  former  minister  in 
Bourguiba’s regime told me, “it is entirely legitimate to write that the state’s religion is Islam in 
the Constitution. It does not matter, because it does not mean anything. You can also add that the 
state has two feet and two hands, it does not make a difference.”
35 In his view, this was a 
symbolic formulation made to appease the partisans of the Islamic identity of Tunisia. Those 
who invoked a secular Tunisia were ready to accept this formulation as the line beyond which 
they would not go. “We thought we should work on a minimum consensus and defend modern 
Tunisia, unite on the values of human rights and liberty of conscience. It is true that we also said 
that  we  agree  to  keep  article  one  of  the  constitution  as  the  maximum  acceptable.  We  are 
ourselves talking about the religion of Tunisia, and not about the religion of the state, but this 
ambiguity  was  intentional  on  Bourguiba’s  part,”  a  representative  of  the  Pôle  Démocratique 
Moderniste (al-Qutb al-dimuqrati al-hadathi), the left coalition of parties most in agreement Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          15 
with the values of secularism, told me.
36 When I asked a member of the political bureau of al-
Nahdha about the meaning of Article 1, he also responded that it was a matter of identity, no less 
no more, and refused to elaborate further on the meaning of a “state’s religion” except for saying 
that the state should not “control” religion but rather “organize it.”
37 
 
Rached Ghannouchi, Secularism, and Religious Establishment:  
In his books and articles, Rached Ghannouchi, the Islamist party al-Nahdha’s leader and main 
ideologue, engages with the question of the state and its relation with Islam. In particular, he 
often associates secularism (‘ilmaniyya) with authoritarianism and modernity (hadatha). In an 
article  published  in  2011,  he  criticized  the  “secularist  project”  and  defined  it  as  “the 
marginalization of religion and its estrangement from the struggles of life.”
38 In his view, the 
task of the Islamist movement is to “reestablish the relationship between religion and life and the 
leadership  of  religion  over  life.”
39  For  Ghannouchi,  “modernization,”  the  hallmark  of  the 
secularists, is not acceptable within a secular environment, but only in an Islamic framework, 
since the Islamist project embraces all aspects of life.
40 Therefore, in his view, Islam, in order to 
avoid losing its own integrity, has to “penetrate” (ikhtiraq) modernity rather than the other way 
around.
41 His critique of secularism is not unique to the Islamist project. It is common among 
liberal Western intellectuals and activists who advocate religious participation in public life in 
their  own  countries  while  at  the  same  time  rejecting  the  presence  of  religion  in  the  state.
42 
However, Ghannouchi’s project is not that of a liberal critique of secularism. Ghannouchi does 
not envision, in a future Tunisian democracy, a separation of religion and state: in the very words 
of Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution, Islam is for him and for his movement “the religion of the 
state.” The Islamist movement argues for religious establishment and democracy, a combination 16  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
that has perhaps gained more appeal for the movement with Ghannouchi’s long exile in Great 
Britain.  
Therefore, for al-Nahdha, the liberation of Islam from the control of the state does not 
mean the separation of state and religion, or even neutrality of the state towards religion. The 
state that Ghannouchi envisions is a civil and democratic state, but it also needs to engage with 
religion in specific ways: to organize it, but also, to implement it.  Ghannouchi's liberation of 
Islam from the state does not imply a rupture between them. Rather, the state is put at the service 
of religion, and it is up to those democratically elected to govern and define the ways in which 
this “service” operates. It is striking that Ghannouchi does not talk of “sharia implementation” 
(tatbiq al-shari‘a, a phrase widely used by other Islamist movements), but rather of “Islamic 
implementation” (tatbiq islami), a concept on which he does not elaborate.
43 In addition, the 
relationship  between  state  and  religion  remains  ambivalent  in  the  thought  of  al-Nahdha’s 
activists.  On  the  one  hand,  they  clearly  articulate  a  desire  to  liberate  religion  from  state 
domination: the first issues of their weekly journal al-Fajr contained several articles demanding 
“the liberation of the mosques.”
44 On the other hand, they also insist that the state must organize 
(tanzim) religion without controlling it.
45  
 Although the critique of state monopolization of religious institutions is central in the 
writings  of  al-Nahdha  activists,  it  does  not  lead  them  to  deepen  their  reflections  about  the 
legitimacy and the practical operations of a religious establishment: How would their party, 
heading the next government, make the state “Muslim”? This is the precise challenge that the 
Islamist movements in the Middle East overall have encountered after coming to power in the 
context of the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011: how to govern with reference to Islam and its values 
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the same time had the project to inculcate secular values to its subjects. A deep tension exists in 
the  Islamist  project  between  liberating  Islam  from  the  state’s  control  and  its  enterprises  of 
domestication on the one hand, and policy making based on religious values (nizam mina’l-
qiyam)  on  the  other  hand.
46  It  is,  I  want  to  suggest,  this  deep  tension  that  makes  the 
Islamists/secularists debate focus on ways of life rather than on ideologies and on the nature of 
the state. As Ghannouchi said in a public conference in March 2012, “The primary orbit for 
religion is not the state’s apparatuses, but rather individual and personal convictions.”
47 The 
grand narrative of the Islamic state as the institution implementing sharia law is not part of 
Ghannouchi’s  discourse.  His  confident  vision  of  a  Tunisian  society  that  has  experienced  a 
religious revival in the last decades also makes the use of the state to that end unnecessary: “we 
do not need to impose Islam because it is the people’s religion and not the elite’s, and Islam has 
not endured for so long because of states’ influence, but rather due to the large acceptance it 
enjoys among its adherents, in fact the state has often been a burden on religion.”
48 
I will now reflect on the notion of secularism as it is understood by the Islamist party and 
examine  how  the  opposition  between  “Islamism”  and  “secularism”  translates  at  the  political 
level.   
 
3.  The Power of Labels: Laïcité, Modernity, and Islam.   
Two Competing “Ways of Life” 
After the October 23, 2011 elections, secular parties on the left and other civil organization 
groups anxiously commented on the sudden emergence of the Islamist party at the center of 
Tunisia’s political game: they accepted the ballot box results, but they were deeply worried about 
the future of “secular” Tunisia. When they spoke of secularism, they often used the French 18  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
concept of laïcité. More specifically, some worried about the future of women’s and individual 
rights. During and after the electoral campaign, the political and intellectual landscapes were 
polarized between the Islamists and their adversaries, who called themselves the “modernists,” 
“the  progressives,”  or  the  “secularists,”  and  who  denied  the  Islamists  the  “modernist”  and 
“progressive” labels. These labels where inherited from the authoritarian regime, and continued 
to operate as political identifiers in everyday political life after January 14, 2011. Under the 
regime  of  Presidents  Bourguiba  and  Ben  Ali,  official  narratives  described  Islamism  as  the 
antithesis  of  “modernity”  and  “progress.”  The  civil  war  developing  in  neighboring  Algeria 
between the Islamist armed groups and the military and the consequences of 9/11 and “the war 
on terror” helped the Tunisian regime portray Islamism as a threat to civil peace and present 
itself  as  the  best  shield  against  it.  In  the  official  narratives,  Islamism  put  into  question  the 
“modern” ways of life of Tunisians and particularly women’s rights.
49 It was striking that after 
January 2011, the opposition between the Islamist project and their opponents’ understanding of 
their own model of society reflected a dichotomy between two “ways of life” rather than two 
systematically defined political ideologies and theoretical models for the state. Ahmed Ibrahim, 
leader of the Tajdid party (previously the Tunisian Communist Party), stated in October 2011, 
“Today in Tunisia, there is a modernist trend that seeks to reinforce freedoms and progressive 
values… There is another trend that wants to use the people’s religious sentiments and attempts 
to impose a certain control and a very specific way of life.”
50 These ways of life were often 
described by referring to bodily practices. Ben Ali’s regime in its fight against Islamists took aim 
at bodily practices, as shown by the earlier crystallization of the “Islamist/secularist” debate 
around the wearing of hijab, which Ben Ali’s regime took pains to repress.
51 This focus on body 
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2010-2011. Ajmi Lourimi, a member of al-Nahdha’s leadership, described these two camps to 
me in the following terms, “The Islamist movements are afraid for Islam, and the secularists are 
afraid of Islam. And the secularists are afraid for their own individual way of life. They are afraid 
for their own individual rights. This is not about political rights, or citizenship rights, or religious 
rights. They are afraid not to be able to buy their wine at the café, not to be able to dress the way 
they want.”
52 This understanding gives us a clue to the nature of politics in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. 
Indeed, Ajmi Lourimi recognized that there was an agreement between all Tunisians on the 
principles of a democratic state, but that there was a need for a “new political culture” that would 
accept religion in the public space. He added: “Who dominates? The secularists. Those who 
oppose religion and want to eliminate it from the life of society…We demand a civil state, with 
institutions,  and  an  independent  justice  system.  Legitimacy  comes  from  the  ballot  box.  We 
demand political alternation, the respect of minorities’ rights, and the defense of the principle of 
tolerance of the other. When we talk about a civil state, we do not mean a theocratic state. We 
want separation and balance between powers…And a press that is independent...We agree on the 
broad principles, on the basic principles that Islamists, liberals, secularists believe in: individual 
liberties, equality between all citizens. Are these principles the essence of secularism? No, these 
are the values of all children of Tunisia. Islam can work within these values. In addition, we have 
to revive the mosques, and the mosque pulpits, which must not be a space for political struggle, 
but for worship: they do not belong to political parties.”
53   
For  Ajmi  Lourimi,  as  well  as  for  the  rest  of  the  political  spectrum,  politics  was  not 
defined around ideological conceptions referring to well defined philosophical systems, such as 
those  traditionally  produced  by  the  left  side  of  the  political  spectrum  or  as  the  systematic 
constructions elaborated by the classic thinkers of political Islam–Abu al-Alaa al-Mawdudi or 20  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
Sayyid Qutb, for instance. It revolved instead around 1) political procedures and 2) competing 
understandings of ways of life. Politics was defined around interrogations inherent to belief and 
conduct, rather than around “models” or blueprints for a social and political order. Rather than 
these “ways of life” deriving from theoretical considerations about political systems and theories 
of the state, they defined the essence of the political understandings represented by “Islamism” 
and “secularism.” In post-Ben Ali Tunisia, political actors, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens 
argued about the ways of life they wanted, fearing that one camp would impose its own way of 
life on the other. None of them had a political theory to defend or a conceptual edifice to refer to, 
but  they  had  models  of  life  to  propose.  Yadh  Ben  Achour,  a  high  profile  legal  scholar 
commented on the dichotomy opposing the Islamists and the secularists in the following way, 
“The Islamists are in a tight spot between their basic convictions and religious law on the one 
hand, and the enormous pressure that is exerted on them on the other hand: the pressure of 
modern  ideas,  of  the  International  conventions  for  instance.  They  reject  this  pressure,  the 
pressure of modern legal philosophy. Therefore, they become vague. All depends on the context 
in which they communicate. All depends on the climate. It is a contextual party. …They are 
trapped in their contradictions. The Islamists are torn. They would like to live in their terrestrial 
city like in the time of the prophet, following the model of Madina. On the other hand, they have 
a  world  in  front  of  them  that  is  resisting:  women  wearing  bikinis  and  the  heavy  drinkers. 
Tunisians are good believers who do not like constraints.”
54 It is striking that both Ajmi Lourimi 
and Yadh Ben Achour defined the secularist and the Islamist projects as exclusively focused on 
ways of life respectively related to irreconcilable bodily practices.  
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Can these labels of “Islamism” and “secularism” help us describe the political landscape of post-
Ben Ali Tunisia? The previous regimes instrumentalized them in order to divide and weaken the 
opposition, which compels us to use them carefully. However, these labels and the ways in 
which they have been elaborated play an important role and have a complex genealogy that has 
not been examined in detail yet. Their meanings are highly contentious. They do not encompass 
the totality of the political landscape. Those who are called “secularists” in particular, be they 
active in political parties or in civil society organizations, do not all necessarily center their 
platforms and ideas on secularism per se. Even though, for instance, the Pôle Démocratique 
Moderniste (PDM) focused its political campaign on an anti-Islamist agenda and on the values of 
secularism, this was not the case of the center-left party who obtained the best score after al-
Nahdha—the  Congrès  pour  la  République  (CPR).  This  party  has  accepted  to  govern  in  a 
coalition  with  the  Islamist  party  after  the  October  23
rd  election.  The  CPR’s  ex-leader  and 
president of the interim government, Moncef Marzouki, is an intransigent defender of individual 
freedoms and human rights, who was president of the Tunisian Human Rights League between 
1989 and 1992. He progressively became closer to the Islamist party, and started to include 
marked  references  to  Islam  in  his  political  narratives.
55  This  means  that  he  attempted  to 
destabilize the secularist/Islamist dichotomy by ignoring it. The governmental coalition formed 
after the October 23, 2011 elections, or “troika,” uniting al-Nahdha, the CPR, and Ettakatol also 
demonstrated the willingness of part of the left to collaborate with al-Nahdha in the government. 
Other parties that had worked with al-Nahdha in the October 18, 2005 alliance, such as the Parti 
Démocratique Progressiste (PDP), remained in the opposition and distanced themselves from and 
became more critical of the Islamist party. However, the political forces that did not belong to 
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as “secularists,” and sometimes as “the party of France,” or hizb Faransa. The efforts to define 
politics outside of this dichotomy did not succeed. It is therefore worth examining how Islamist 
activists and intellectuals, in the liberalized transitional context, described the secularists. Indeed, 
even though the Islamists themselves are the object of numerous academic and political studies, 
scholarly work pays little attention to the Islamist narratives on secularism and secularists. In a 
country where the authoritarian state attempted to inculcate secular values to its subjects, the 
Islamists’ representation of “secularism” merits examination. 
In the second issue of the weekly al-Nahdha party’s journal al-Fajr dated April 16, 2011, 
Shawqi Bu‘anani, a Tunisian academic, published a piece titled “The Constitution between the 
Islamists  and  the  Secularists.”
56  He  developed  an  analysis  of  secularism  and  secularists  that 
implicitly reappropriated the tropes usually used in academic and political writings on Islamism. 
For him, it was a mistake to think that the Tunisian protests had nothing to do with the question 
of secularism. It was, he argued, “a political problem” that divided the political landscape in two 
camps, and even two classes (tabaqatayn). He continued that there were two sorts of secularism: 
the first, which he accepted, separated the state and the religious institution
57; the second was 
“radical” and sought to eliminate religion from the public space and from life altogether. For 
Bu‘anani radical secularism could only produce dictatorship. Having in mind the regime of Ben 
Ali, he also associated radical forms of secularism with the models of radical secularism of Nazi 
Germany, the Soviet Union, and France. For him, these cases exemplified radical secularism 
(‘ilmaniyya  mutatarrifa)  because  their  secularism  was  “comprehensive”  (shamila);  radical 
secularism “separates religion from the life of the Muslim. We refuse secularism as a philosophy 
and an order (nizam) for life. We think that this type of secularism contradicts the intentions of 
our noble Islamic religion.”
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typically produced about Islamism by secularists and which go like this: in spite of the protests 
not being about Islam, it is important to deal with the question of Islamism as a “potential 
political  problem.”  Islamism  itself  has  many  shades:  radical  Islam  cannot  combine  with 
democracy and is therefore unacceptable, because it considers Islam as the foundation for a 
“comprehensive”  order.  This  representation  of  secularism  as  having  a  plurality  of  possible 
meanings also led Ghannouchi to favor secularism as “a procedure” that makes the state, in a 
position of neutrality, guarantee freedoms and in particular religious freedom, over secularism as 
a “Jacobin model” or a “separation [between state and religion] in the French sense” of an 
“atheist  philosophy”  that  excludes  religion  from  the  public  realm.
59  Therefore,  Ghannouchi 
accepts secularism as a specific set of procedures that would allow different ways of life to 
develop and, perhaps, compete, but does not accept it as a “philosophy,” that is as what could 
become  the  foundation  of  a  way  a  life  he  disapproves  of.  However,  this  perspective  is  not 
accepted by all of al-Nahdha’s leadership, who, for the more conservative part, is not ready to 
accept neither procedural nor substantive secularism.  
 
The Imagined Sociology of Secularism and Islamism: 
In addition to the description of the ideas behind Islamism and secularism by each camp, an 
imagined sociology of one another’s constituencies also circulated. As early as Spring 2011, the 
ideological polarization between the “Islamist” and the “secularist” camps was playing out in a 
public debate, and the “Islamist” and “secularist” categories were endowed with a significant 
political role. The two “camps” built up a representation of each other through a mirror effect 
that distorted a complex reality by stereotyping it. However, the stereotypes themselves are not 
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the other side, as well as mobilize recruits for one’s own camp. These descriptions are certainly 
different from what a rigorous sociology of party constituencies would reveal.  
Indeed, in the political imagination of Tunisians, these two camps are represented by one 
another  as  being  separated  by  language,  culture,  and  class  membership,  and  therefore  as 
embodying  competing  ways  of  life.  The  secularist  camp  is  often  seen  by  the  Islamists  as 
Francophone and imbued with the values of French laïcité, as part of the old establishment of the 
post-colonial political and intellectual elites, and therefore as the ally of the authoritarian regime. 
Rached Ghannouchi explicitly equated laïcité with Ben Ali’s regime in a speech he gave on 
secularism  in  Tunis  on  March  12,  2012,  to  an  audience  where  many  representatives  of  the 
secularist intelligentsia were present: “The stripping of the state from religion would turn the 
state into a mafia.”
60 The secularist camp is also represented as mimicking Westernized ways of 
life. The Islamists, on the other hand, are represented by the secularists as coming from a larger 
and perhaps more eclectic social spectrum. They are often portrayed as part of the Arabophone 
segments, of the lower urban middle classes as well as of poorer sections of society that define 
the identity of Tunisia along strict Arab and Muslim lines. It is said that they are particularly 
attuned  to–and  influenced  by–the  language  of  the  Arab  satellite  television  programs.  This 
imagined  sociology  helps  to  anchor  “Islamism”  and  “secularism”  as  political  identities  and 
constituencies and to reify each camp by grounding it into a post-colonial map that involves 
geographical, socio-economic, and cultural differences. Al-Nahdha is seen today as the party of 
the masses taking their revenge against the “Francophone” minority elite establishment and as 
being rooted in Oriental and Arab influences. The secularist parties are seen to represent more 
affluent segment of societies and to speak the language of the French episteme. However, this 
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of October 2011 and only operates as the foundation of political arguments in the debate between 
secularists and Islamists. Indeed, the results of the election of October 23, 2011 show the same 
cleavages and same percentages in the French districts as in the Tunisian districts. This means 
that language is not a factor in explaining the electoral results since the Tunisian population that 
resides in France is mostly Francophone. In addition, al-Nahdha party was particularly strong in 
large urban centers, and did relatively poorly in the Center West region of Tunisia. It obtained its 
lowest score (14.30%) in Sidi Bouzid, the cradle of the uprisings, and one of its highest scores of 
40.64% in Ben Arous, a poor and densely populated suburb of Tunis. Al-Nahdha’s constituency 
seems to be as urban and as educated as that of the center left parties such as CPR and Ettakatol. 
In fact, none of the main secular or Islamist parties (CPR, Ettakatol, and al-Nahdha) won in Sidi 
Bouzid  and  Kasserine,  two  regions  where  social  exclusion  and  poverty  were  the  highest.  A 
populist  list,  al-‘aridha  al-sha‘biyya,  obtained  35.06%  of  the  votes  versus  1.55%  for  CPR, 
0.97%  for  Ettakatol,  and  14.30%  for  al-Nahdha.
61  This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  secularist 
parties’ and al-Nahdha’s constituencies are not necessarily that different in terms of their socio-
economic characteristics. What seems to differentiate them more clearly is their understanding of 
cultural mores and identity politics, making al-Nahdha and secular parties defend two contrasting 
ways of life. 
 
Ways of Life as Limits to Freedoms 
Under the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the state officialized the “modern” way of life: 
“feminist”  and  “westernized,”  as  well  as  “authentically  Tunisian.”  The  authoritarian  regime 
stigmatized and repressed the “Islamist” way of life. After the 2011 protests, these two camps 
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they also initiated a dialogue in public forums. They were both free of the previous forms of 
direct and repressive censorship by the state, but were still constrained by these representations. 
They both came in defense of freedom, against the authoritarianism of the post-colonial regime, 
but they also both thought they needed to set limits to these freedoms in order to protect their 
ways of life in the new political competition that had opened up. The emergence of controversies 
helped shape these positions about limits to freedom. For instance, for the secularists, unlimited 
freedoms  given  to  the  Islamists  were  threatening  “modernity,”  as  happened  when  female 
students requested to be allowed in the university campus of La Mannouba University wearing a 
face veil at the end of the year 2011. For the Islamists, unlimited freedom of expression given to 
the “modernists” in the media was problematic. As an illustration of this tension, I will now 
examine a controversy that shows how the question of freedom of expression was being legally 
formulated in the period of political transition, and how some Islamists –who did not necessarily 
belong to al-Nahdha—referred to the notion of nizam ‘amm or “public order” to confront their 
political adversaries in continuity with the legal narratives of the authoritarian regime. 
 
4.  From Iran to Tunisia: the Persepolis Controversy in Court 
The Broadcast of Persepolis and the Public Order Argument 
On  October  7,  2011,  the  Maghrebi  private  television  channel  Nessma  broadcast  the  movie 
Persepolis by Iranian film director Marjane Satrapi. The movie was dubbed in Tunisian dialect, 
in order to reach the largest possible audience. It was followed by a televised debate between 
four Tunisian intellectuals who discussed the movie in relation to the events taking place in 
Tunisia at that time. The debate was cast in the following terms: “will Tunisia be the next Iran?” 
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of the Shah, whose dictatorship was compared to that of Ben Ali by the participants. It also 
spoke to the false hopes for democracy that the early coalition between the Islamists and the left 
had created in Iran before the takeover by the Mollahs. Nessma was clearly trying to build a 
parallel between the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Tunisian political transition of 2011. The 
panelists around the table were all from the so called modernist trend, and no representative of 
the Islamist movement was present. They all confidently envisioned Tunisia in contrast with the 
Iranian model, underlining that modernism was so strong in Tunisian society that it could only 
prevail.  Social  networks  such  as  Twitter  and  Facebook,  as  well  as  Tunisian,  French  and 
International news media announced afterwards that around “300 Salafis” had attempted to storm 
the offices of the television station and to attack its director, condemning scenes involving sex 
and  alcohol  in  the  movie,  as  well  as  a  scene  in  which  God  is  represented  in  human  form. 
Contradictory reports subsequently claimed that the number of 300 protesters had been inflated 
and that the crowd did not consist of “Salafi” protestors exclusively. Doubt was also cast on the 
identity and the motives of the protestors and it was alleged that they might have been sent by 
those who wanted to derail the election scheduled for October 23, 2011.  
 
Public Order and the Limits to Freedoms 
More importantly for my purpose, the controversy took a legal turn transferring the political 
contentions  that  had  taken  place  in  the  streets  and  on  the  social  networks  to  the  sphere  of 
litigation: a collective of 144 lawyers acted as the plaintiff against the TV station CEO, Nabil 
Karoui. This collective claimed that Karoui had offended the “sacred values of Islam,” as well as 
“decency.”
62 Karoui defended his actions by saying that the movie had been shown in theaters 
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retorted to him that to show a movie in theaters had a lesser impact than to broadcast it on 
television.Movie theaters only gave access to the film to a small audience, but television made it 
enter into all Tunisian homes. The lawyers’ collective based its complaint on two legal texts: the 
Press  Code  of  1975,  a  law  that  had  been  passed  under  President  Bourguiba  who  had  been 
appointed “President for Life” a year earlier.
63 They referred to Articles 42 and 48 in particular. 
Article 42 states that “the accomplices of a crime or a misdemeanor will be punished if through 
the  press  or  any  other  intentional  mode  of  dissemination,  they  will  have  directly  provoked 
(yuharridhuna mubasharatan shakhsan aw ashkhas) the author or the authors of a crime, and if 
the provocation “had an effect.” Article 48 states that “belittling the dignity (nayl min karama) of 
an authorized religion” is also part of the offenses taken into account in Article 42. They also 
relied on the Penal Code, in which Article 226 penalizes “obscenity” (fuhsh) and Article 226a 
penalizes offenses against public decency (al-akhlaq al-hamida, a direct translation of the French 
“bonne moeurs”) and public morality (al-adab al-‘amma). The complaint brought to the court 
did not focus on a theological argument, but rather on a legal one. During the November 17
th 
audience of the court of first instance in Tunis, the Judge almost exclusively focused on the 
question of “complicity” of Karoui, asking if the film itself was at the origin of the protests and 
of the violent actions that followed, rather than if Nessma had the legal right to show the movie. 
Karoui insisted that the protestors had been provoked by political actors who had incited them 
into the streets and not by the movie itself. The argument of his accusers was that it was the 
showing of the movie that was the culprit.
64 Karoui, they said, should have anticipated the effects 
of such a movie on the Tunisian population. According to them, the offense was about the 
disturbance of “public order” by the showing of the film rather than about the movie’s depiction 
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of an authorized religion, belongs to a Chapter of the 1975 Press Code titled “Offenses Against 
Public Order” (junah murtakaba dhidd al-nizam al-‘amm). It is worth underlining that Tunisian 
law–as does French law, which influenced it significantly–often associates religion and religious 
freedom with the notion of public order. In the 1959 Tunisian constitution, freedom of belief was 
limited by the necessity to protect “public order,” or al-nizam al-‘amm. In French law, the notion 
of public order has multiple meanings because, as underlined by Didier Bodin, it is used in 
different branches of law,
65 such as criminal law, administrative law, and international private 
law. The exception “of public order” is invoked in French international private law when foreign 
law is not taken into account in national courts’ processes of adjudication involving foreigners.
66 
The  same  exception  is  used  in  Tunisian  international  private  law.
67  When  the  discrepancy 
between two legal regimes is too important, the private law from the other state does not apply, 
because the foreign norm “harms” public order. As analyzed by Bodin, “International public 
order defines the limits of tolerance of our juridical system vis-à-vis foreign institutions.”
  68 
However, in French law, the notion of public order is not restricted to International private law. 
In administrative law, itself a branch of public law, the notion of public order means “public 
security” (sécurité publique), that is “security, tranquility, salubrity, or public morality.”
69 It is in 
this sense that the 1905 French law of separation of church and state intends the notion of public 
order, and defines it as the limit to the tolerance of religious freedom. As in international private 
law, the notion of public order is connected with what a society can tolerate, that is what it can 
accept even if it does not approve. However, the administrative meaning of the notion of public 
order makes the physical implications of the threats to public order–that is the possibility of 
disorder  and  agitation  that  would  make  individuals  and  society  physically  vulnerable–more 
manifest.  Article  5  of  the  Tunisian  1959  Constitution  states  that  “the  Tunisian  Republic 30  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
guarantees the inviolability of the human person and freedom of conscience, and protects the free 
exercise of religion, as long as it does not disturb the public order.” This article, which mirrors 
Article 48 of the Press Code, may therefore be used to curb religious freedom.  
For the Islamists, who associated in the collective of lawyers against Nessma TV, the 
notion of public order became the legal concept through which it was possible to make their 
claims against an unrestrained freedom of expression. Like the state, they understood the notion 
of freedom to be limited by the intolerance of the Tunisian public for specific cultural forms, an 
intolerance measured by the physical violence provoked by the showing of the movie.   
The recourse to the legal structures of the authoritarian state shows that the Islamists were 
acting in a legalistic way and that, more importantly, they were formulating their claim through 
the rule of exception related to the notion of public order, that very public order that had limited  
their  own  freedom  of  religious  practice  and  expression  under  the  authoritarian  regime.  As 
analyzed by Hussein Agrama, the notion of public order is indeed a key tool for organizing 
religion and freedom of expression as objects of regulation and control by the state
70. Although 
“secularists” and “Islamists” compete aggressively at the political level, they both belong to and 
accept  a  regime  that  regulates  freedom  through  the  legal  exception  of  public  order.  Their 
contrasting visions of ideal ways of life mold themselves in the structures of the same old post-
colonial state. They envision the new political life of Tunisia as a set of  procedures that have no 
political meaning–i.e. that are not based on a philosophy or political theory that one would refer 
to when trying to make sense of these procedures–and that exist to protect each way of life 
against the other. 
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At the end of March 2012, when debates were raging about the mention of sharia as a source for 
legislation in the constitution, Rached al-Ghannouchi declared that al-Nahdha would not ask for 
its  inclusion.  His  declaration  put  an  end  to  some  of  the  tensions  between  Islamists  and 
secularists,  and  provoked  disappointments  and  critiques  within  his  own  camp.  Some  in  the 
secularist camp claimed “victory.” There was certainly a desire on the part of Ghannouchi to 
reach a compromise. However, he also understood that Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution was 
sufficient to make Islam the foundation of a way of life in Tunisia. Indeed, since sharia was to be 
defined through parliamentary legislation for him, its marked presence in the constitution was 
not necessary, perhaps without any effect, and therefore only symbolic. After all, since 1959, 
Islam was explicitly mentioned in the constitution and this did not prevent the repression of the 
Islamist movement. In the end, he thought Islam had to be embodied and practiced rather than 
theorized and mentioned in the constitutional narrative.  
Indeed, the current leadership of al-Nahdha never provided a clear theory of the state, and 
did not seem to reflect on what Islamic governance meant, even as it held the reins of power after 
October 2011. It is striking that, whereas Ghannouchi’s narratives contained deep critiques of the 
state  at  the  time  when  he  opposed  it,  al-Nahdha  now  accepted  it,  did  not  seek  to  radically 
transform it, and molded itself quite comfortably in its pre-existing structures. For its leadership, 
Islam defines principles for individuals’ public conduct, and these principles must be protected, 
as guaranteed by the 1975 Press Law and by the current penal code.  
Since Fall 2011, several other affairs have also erupted that have focused on the limits 
that religion can set to freedom of expression. The Persepolis controversy ended up with the 
public prosecutor fining Nabil Karoui 2,400 Tunisian Dinars (approximately $1,530) on May 3, 
2012, for “trouble against public order.” The charge of the offense against religion and public 32  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
morality  was  dismissed  by  the  Judge,  who  perhaps  had  opted  for  a  middle  ground  stance. 
Perhaps worried about the political repercussions of the affair, as the trial was ending al-Nahdha 
officially announced that the Persepolis case should not have been brought to court, and that a 
trial against Karoui “was not the best solution to solve the conflict between on the one hand the 
people’s  identity  and  the  attachment  to  the  sacred,  and  on  the  other  hand  freedom  of 
expression.”
71  Other  similar  affairs  developed  in  the  course  of  2012,  in  which  freedom  of 
expression was constrained by a justice decision. In these cases, the plaintiffs were individuals or 
groups who were often close to the Islamist movements or hailed from the nebulous Salafist 
trend. On March 28, 2012, two young men who published caricatures of the prophet Muhammad 
on the social networks were sentenced to 7 years of prison by the Mahdia correctional court for 
“disseminating publications disturbing  public order” and “offense to morality.” The complaint 
against the two young men was brought to court by a lawyer who denounced their atheism and 
was barely covered by the Tunisian and foreign media.
72 On March 8, 2012, the Director of the 
journal Attounsia was sentenced to pay a fine of 1,000 Tunisian Dinars (approximately $640) for 
having published on the journal’s cover the photograph of a naked woman. On June 11, 2012, 
the artists exhibiting their works in the hall of the Abdelliyya Palace in the suburbs of La Marsa, 
saw a court bailif ask them to remove pictures considered by some Salafists as “blasphemous.” 
After the artists refused to let the bailif in, the exhibit was attacked by Salafists who destroyed 
some of the art works. The self-proclaimed imam of the Zaytuna Mosque, Houcine Laabidi, 
called for the artists’ murder. On August 17, two artists who were part of the exhibit were 
brought to justice by the tribunal of first instance of Tunis for “disturbing public order and 
offending decency.” The affair mobilized civil society groups in defense of the artists, leading to 
the minister of culture–Mehdi Mabrouk, an independent–changing his mind about the merits of Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          33 
the exhibit. He had declared at first that it was mediocre and did not warrant to be defended, but 
eventually concluded that it had to be defended in the name of freedom of expression.   
In all these affairs, which seriously compromise a freedom of expression only gained 
after  the  2010-11  protests,  the  Troika  government  and  al-Nahdha  in  particular  have  taken 
ambivalent positions, or have avoided taking a clear one, creating tensions within the governing 
coalition  and  beyond.  Al-Nahdha  seems  to  be  drawn  by  its  right  wing  and  the  Salafi 
constituencies into an uncompromising position to defend “sacred values” at the expense of 
freedom of expression. In addition, some of its members have also drawn the public debate 
toward conservative understandings of social mores and limits to freedom of expression in two 
legislative proposals presented to the Constituent Assembly. On August 1, 2012, the Committee 
for Rights and Liberties in the Assembly voted a constitutional article defining the “principle of 
[the] complementarity of women and men within the family,” which was defended by al-Nahdha 
female  member  and  vice  president  of  the  Assembly  Maherzia  Laabidi.  However,  after  two 
months of intense debates outside of the Assembly, the committee dropped the article. Samir 
Dilou, member of the Troika and of the al-Nahdha party, declared on September 21, 2012 that 
the  notion  of  complementarity  “had  no  meaning.”
73  In  the  same  vein,  as  a  response  to  the 
Abdelliya controversy, on August 1
st, 2012, the al-Nahdha group in the Constituent Assembly 
presented a draft law to amend the penal code so that that it would criminalize offenses against 
“sacred  values”  and  “symbols.”  The  project  was  eventually  withdrawn  after  the  strong 
opposition of civil society groups.   
These  affairs  show  that  the  two  principles  of  Islam’s  protection  and  freedom  of 
expression are now being pitted against each other, giving shape to cultural wars that will frame 
the politics of Tunisia for a long time. They are replacing the old debate between the “secular 34  Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
state” and the “Islamic state,” and seem to thrive in the framework of the institutions of the old 
regime. Although al-Nahdha attempted to modify the law to provide more protection to Islamic 
values  and  a  more  Islamic  veneer  to  the  notion  of  “public  order,”  the  current  laws  already 
provide such a protection and are being used effectively to stifle freedom of expression. Al-
Nahdha is not the only actor to use these laws. Salafis, as well as Islamist lawyers, have used 
them as political devices, and other constituencies in the future will surely use the public order 
exception to shape the public space in the way they see fit. A party such as Nida Tunis, which 
was formed in the summer of 2012 to counter al-Nahdha on a modernist platform, might also use 
the same exception if it comes to power. While these affairs follow one another and competing 
representations of ways of life overwhelm the public debates in Tunisia, and while political 
forces actively prepare for future elections, little attention is given to economic reform and to the 
foundations  of  the  democratic  state.  For  these  reasons,  the  authoritarian  state  founded  by 
Bourguiba and reappropriated by Ben Ali might very well endure under a democratically elected 
government. 
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1 The period of mass protests that started on December 17, 2010–the day of the self-immolation of Mohamed 
Bouazizi–and ended on January 14, 2011–the departure of President Ben Ali from the country–was called a thawra 
by Tunisians, which can be translated by “uprising,”  “revolt,” or “revolution.” In its current usage, the word thawra 
often refers to revolutions of modern times such as the French revolution of 1789 or the revolt of Tunisians against 
the Bey’s taxation policies in 1864. However, as I write these lines, it is too early to say if a revolution in the sense 
of a profound transformation of the state and of the socio-economic structures will take place as a consequence of 
the protests of 2010-2011. The state structures, the police, and the army, as well as the economic structures, have 
remained largely unchanged as I write these lines. For a widely accepted definition of social revolutions, see Theda 
Scokpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
2 Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” Constellations, Volume 1, (1994), 1. I am thankful to Roxanne Euben for 
having mentioned this text to me.  
3 “Go away” in colloquial French, or “beat it.” 
4 The noun “people” in Arabic, al-sha‘b, is a singular, contrary to its usage in English. The notion of a people 
represents a singular actor.  
5 A student who participated in the protests in Tunis before and after the fall of President Ben Ali, interviewed by 
the author, Tunis June 14, 2011. Competing Ways of Life: Malika Zeghal          35 
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